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We find region-specific complementarity between investments in public infrastructure and 
education, both k-12 and postsecondary. The complementarity helps to explain how regions 
capture returns to investments in education even when residents are mobile, and is strong enough 
for the effect of tax-financed expenditures on either public infrastructure or education to be 
significantly positive when spending on the other is high, even though the independent effect of 
either one is negative. Effects are identified using a recursive structure, very long lags, GMM-
instrumental variables, and multiple controls for heterogeneity. Estimates are robust across 







The rapidly burgeoning literature on the effects of education on economic growth emphasizes 
two closely related channels: traditional production spillovers, the extent to which broad public 
investments in education raise the productivity of labor and other factors of production, as in 
Cohen and Paul (2004), Evans and Karras (1994), Duffy-Deno and Eberts (1991), and Pereira 
(2000); or more narrowly, the role of higher education in innovation and technological change, 
as in Aghion et. al., (2009) and Ciccone and Papiannou (2009).  Both channels are likely 
important, but neither helps to explain why regions invest in human capital, given that residents 
are mobile and that additional human capital makes them more mobile still. We pursue this 
question, and find evidence of region-specific complementarity between public investments in 
education and infrastructure, both physical and institutional. The localized complementarity 
provides one plausible explanation for how regions might retain returns to public investments in 
human capital: coordinated investments in public infrastructure and education induce locally 
specific spillovers, raising productivity, wages, and incomes relative to regions that do not make 
similar investments.  
Contribution 
A number of previous studies, including those cited above, find that increased regional 
spending on education or public infrastructure has positive effects on the performance of 
regional economies. None of these studies, however, explicitly account for the opportunity cost 
of the increased expenditures. All face the problem of the endogeneity of public expenditure, 
which is likely to bias coefficients in favor of finding a positive effect of public spending on 
growth. None account for the possibility that education and infrastructure are complements in the 
producing growth. Our study, then, is distinguished from prior studies in accounting explicitly 
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for the opportunity cost of increased tax expenditures, adopting several different strategies to 
deal with endogeneity, and accounting for possible complementarity between public education 
and infrastructure.   
Opportunity cost 
We account explicitly for the opportunity cost of increased expenditures on public education 
or infrastructure via a fully specified government budget constraint: we estimate growth effects 
of state and local expenditures on public infrastructure and education, while simultaneously 
accounting for the opportunity cost (in terms of growth) of the corresponding taxes.  By fully 
specifying the budget constraint, one can gauge the effect of a change in any element of the 
budget, net of the effect of a compensating change in any other element. Though widely ignored 
in empirical specifications for regional growth, the theoretical rationale for this approach to 
opportunity cost is set out in Barro (1989), and the corresponding empirical rationale is set out in 
Helms (1985), Mofidi and Stone (1990), Kneller et al., (1999), and more recently, Bania, et. al., 
(2007).  Empirically, the fully specified government budget constraint is necessarily comprised 
of perfectly collinear elements, requiring that at least one budget element be omitted to identify 
the remaining parameters. Thus, the estimated parameters reflect the effect of a change in the 
corresponding variable, given a compensating change in the omitted budget element.  We omit 
taxes and fees, so that parameters on expenditure categories, e.g., public infrastructure and 
education reflect the joint effect of these expenditures and the corresponding taxes and fees 
necessary to support them. 
Identification and endogeneity  
A second factor distinguishing our work is that fifty years of panel data enable us to identify 
the spillover effects of public education and infrastructure on growth using several alternative 
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empirical strategies. We begin by specifying a recursive structure with very long, generation-
length lags and by incorporating both state and time fixed effects.  We then assess the success of 
this strategy in three ways.  First, we compare the equivalence of least-squares and GMM 
instrumental-variable estimates when the instruments are both empirically powerful and 
statistically exogenous, i.e., when one would expect a divergence if the least-squares estimator 
were biased. We then explore the sensitivity of our results to several controls for time-varying 
and spatial factors that could contribute to endogeneity bias. Finally, we exploit the half-century 
of data to apply dynamic time-series tests for Granger causality.  Our standard for robustness is 
convergent evidence among all three approaches. 
Complementarity 
Our findings suggest that the direct effect on growth of tax-financed expenditures on either 
public education or infrastructure is significantly negative,1 but the complementarity, or spillover 
effect of each on the other is positive enough when the level of the other is high to make their 
total effects significantly positive. Our findings are broadly consistent with the agglomeration-
type economies found by Cohen and Paul (2004), the complementarities among various forms of 
both public and private capital found by Pereira (2000)—as well as the complementary spillovers 
between education and institutional infrastructure (e.g., judicial systems and public safety) found 
by Hanushek (2007) for a panel of developing countries.  
                                                 
1 A standard Cobb-Douglas production function, for example, implies a non-positive productivity effect for 
investments in education or infrastructure when the level of the other is zero, which leaves only the negative burden 
of taxes required to finance the investments. Evans and Karras (1994) also find either insignificant or negative 
effects for public infrastructure alone. 
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Data  
Our data for state fiscal variables are available for 1957-2007 from the Census of 
Governments at five-year intervals2; from the Bureau of Labor Statistics for the state 
unemployment rate; and from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, Department of Commerce for 
state real personal income per capita.  We exclude Alaska as an outlier due to the idiosyncratic 
dominance of the Alaska pipeline and extreme variance in its state fiscal variables relative to the 
other 49 states.  Thus, we have data for 49 states at five-year intervals from 1957 to 2007.  
Table1 presents summary statistics for the dependent and explanatory variables.  Our 
dependent variable is GROWTH, the (log percent) growth in real personal income per capita in 
each state.  The average value for GROWTH for the five-year data interval is approximately 12.1 
percent which corresponds to approximately 2.4 percent per annum.  The key fiscal variables are 
TAXES_FEES, the ratio of all state and local taxes and fees to state personal income.  As 
described above, taxes and fees become the reference variable when they are replaced by the 
remainder of the government budget constraint, and eliminated from the estimated equation.  
Thus, the effect of a change in any element of the budget constraint is estimated net of the effect 
of a compensating change in taxes and fees.  Other fiscal variables are FED, the ratio of federal 
governmental transfers to personal income; EDUC, the proportion of personal income devoted to 
public expenditures on education (both higher education and K-12); INFRA, the proportion of 
personal income devoted to public spending on physical and institutional infrastructure3 
excluding EDUC; OTHER, redistributive and consumption-oriented expenditures4; and finally, 
                                                 
2 Equivalent data are not available annually until 1977. 
3We distinguish between expenditures on physical infrastructure (e.g., highways) and institutional infrastructure 
(e.g., public safety) in the extensions of our primary empirical specification reported below. Consistent with the 
complementarity Hanushek and Woessman (2007) find for education and institutional infrastructure across a sample 
of developing countries, we find no significance in the distinction in our data. 
4 INFRA includes expenditures on transportation, public safety, environment and housing, government 
administration, interest payments, and a small residual category of expenditures ‘not elsewhere classified’. OTHER 
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SURPLUS, the budget surplus,5 expressed as a percentage of personal income (negative if a 
deficit).6   
Empirical Specifications 
Theory suggests taxes and public investments in infrastructure and education have an effect 
on economic growth.7 Consistent with Barro (1990), these can be permanent, as in other recent 
endogenous growth models, or apply only to transitions, which Barro, et. al., (1995) and 
Turnovsky (2004) demonstrate could nevertheless, take decades.  
Our primary specification has 25-year moving averages for each of the government fiscal 
variables, i.e., we use average values over the previous 25 years, but we find qualitatively similar 
results using a specification with a discrete 25-year lag.8  For education, this generation-length 
lag incorporates a full cohort of kindergarten through college students, plus several years of 
‘time-to-build’ factors in education. Although the use of long lags in a recursive structure 
substantially mitigates the issues of endogeneity and the spurious correlation arising from short-
term, cyclical, and other factors, our empirical specifications pursue several additional strategies 
to mitigate these issues. We include fixed effects for both state and time, observed time-varying 
controls (the state unemployment rate), and a lagged dependent variable.  The latter helps to 
account for both temporal dynamics and unobserved time-varying heterogeneity, which might 
arise from state-specific variation over time in factors such as private and public capital stocks, 
                                                                                                                                                             
includes expenditures on public welfare, hospitals, health, social insurance administration, and veterans services.  
INFRA is constructed by subtracting EDUC and OTHER from total public expenditures. 
5 For U.S. states, deficits and surpluses are typically small, averaging only about 0.2 percent of personal income. 
While we include the deficit/surplus in our primary specification as a control variable, our results are not sensitive to 
its inclusion.   
6 Also, consistent with other studies (e.g., Helms 1985 and Mofidi and Stone 1990), we treat UI expenditures as 
outside the regular fiscal structure, in part because UI is largely driven federally, with separate accounting. 
7 As with most studies (an exception being Bania et al., 2007) we focus only on linear effects at the margin, not on 
nonlinear effects. 
8 We test the sensitivity of our results to the choice of 25 year lags and find similar results when using 20 and 30 
year lags.   
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privately financed investment in education, and spatial interactions.9  As a further sensitivity 
check, we account for regionally idiosyncratic effects among neighboring states by incorporating 
variables for tax-financed investments in public infrastructure and education by other states in 
the same Census region.10  These specifications result in no substantial change in our primary 
estimates.   
We use instrumental-variable techniques and generalized method-of-moment (GMM) 
estimators to account both for potential endogeneity and for the inconsistency of dynamic fixed-
effects models in samples with a finite number of time periods. In our case, the number of 
periods (11) is substantially less than the number of states (49) included, so the Arellano-Bond 
(1991) and Arellano-Bover (1995) style GMM estimators are appropriate. These estimators use 
lagged values of the dependent variable (in our case 15 to 20-year lags), and other exogenous or 
predetermined regressors as instruments.11 As previously noted, we test the power and 
exogeneity of the instruments and assess the success of our approach by the extent to which 
results using alternative identification strategies converge.  
Regression and GMM Results 
Table 2 presents least-squares and GMM instrumental-variable estimates explaining 
GROWTH, the log change in state real personal income per capita (times 100).  The number of 
discrete five-year interval lags follow variable names in parenthesis and any other number 
following a variable name indicates the number of prior years over which the lagged value of a 
variable is averaged.  The fiscal variable omitted from the estimated equation in Table 2 is 
TAXES_FEES, the ratio of state and local taxes and fees to personal income (times 100), so that 
                                                 
9 Our results are not sensitive to the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable in the specification.   
10 We use the standard Census Bureau definition for the nine census divisions.   
11 Applications of GMM instrumental variables are often sensitive to the number of lags used in the instrument set.  
Here this issue does not appear to be serious since our primary estimates are not sensitive, for example, to whether 
or not a lagged dependent variable is included. 
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changes in expenditures for any fiscal category are implicitly financed by a change in taxes and 
fees.  All the specifications reported in Table 2 include fixed effects for period and state, as well 
as time-varying effects captured by lagged GROWTH.  Robust (panel-corrected) standard errors 
are presented.12   
Key Findings 
We begin with the simplest specifications in columns (1) and (2) and progress to our primary 
specifications in columns (3) and (4).  In column (1), we include productive expenditures as a 
single variable (the sum of EDUC25 and INFRA25) and find a positive and marginally 
significant effect.  In column (2), we enter EDUC25 and INFRA25 as separate variables and find 
that the coefficients on both variables are positive, but only the coefficient on INFRA is 
significant.  We present OLS estimates of our primary specification in the third column, and 
GMM instrumental-variable estimates in the fourth column. The results in columns 3 and 4 are 
stable across the differences both in specifications and in the two estimation techniques. The 
coefficients for the independent, or direct, effects of lagged expenditures on education 
(EDUC25) and on public infrastructure (INFRA25) are negative and significant, while the 
coefficient on the interaction term capturing complementarity, (EDUC25*INFRA25), is 
significantly positive.  The negative direct effects estimated for EDUC25 andINFRA25 suggest 
that any positive endogeneity bias is relatively small. The total impact of the direct and 
complementary effects is negative or positive depending on the levels of investment in EDUC25 
and INFRA25.  The growth effect of tax expenditures on health, welfare, transfer-payment and 
other entitlement programs (i.e., OTHER25) is negative and significant; the coefficient for 
federal transfers (FED25) is positive, but insignificant, as is the coefficient for SURPLUS25. 
                                                 
12 Estimations are performed in EViews 5.1. The robust standard errors, in this case Period SUR, are described in 
EViews 5: User’s Guide (2004, p. 887). 
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For the education and infrastructure parameters, the GMM and OLS estimators yield 
roughly similar results. Given that the instruments are strong, with highly significant first-stage 
F-statistics, and that the J-statistic fails to reject the exogeneity of the instruments, the similarity 
in the OLS and GMM coefficients suggests that, in this case, the use of long lags with a recursive 
structure is a successful identification strategy. The robustness of the OLS estimates is bolstered, 
as well, by the results of tests of Granger causality, which indicate that tax investments in neither 
public infrastructure nor education alone ‘Granger cause’ growth (p= 0.095 and p= 0.2091, 
respectively), but the complementarity between them does (p= 0.0334.)13   
Sensitivity Analysis 
We subject our analysis to a variety of checks to determine how sensitive the results might be 
to various specifications.  In the first column of Table 3, we estimate the model without the 
lagged dependent variable and find that the estimated coefficients are remain similar to our 
primary specification (presented in column 3 of Table 2).  The second column of Table 3 
presents the estimated coefficients for a specification without the inclusion of the surplus 
variable. Again, our results are essentially identical to our primary specification. Finally, we alter 
the model specification to allow for idiosyncratic effects among neighboring states. Specifically, 
we incorporate variables for tax investments in public infrastructure and education by states in 
the same Census region. These estimates are reported in the third column of Table 3, with no 
substantial changes from our primary specification.  
We explore the sensitivity of our findings to alternative lag structures in Table 4 by 
estimating two alternative lag structures: a 30-year average (column 1) and a 20-year average 
(column 2) of the government fiscal variables. While the magnitudes of the coefficients vary 
                                                 
13 Granger tests are performed using two 5-year lags, and EViews 5.1. Results are available on request. The p values  
reported are for tests of the null that the variable does not ‘Granger cause’ growth. 
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somewhat, the pattern of signs and statistical significance is not substantially different from the 
pattern in our primary specification.   
Extensions 
To test for possible differences between K-12 and higher education expenditures, we extend 
the primary specification in Table 2, replacing EDUC25 with separate measures of spending on 
K-12 and higher education in both the linear term and the interactive term. We find no 
statistically significant difference in the coefficients on the linear terms for K-12 and higher 
education. Similarly, we find no statistically significant difference in the interaction terms 
involving K-12 and higher education. Finally, we examine the total effects of K-12 and higher 
education on growth and again find no statistically significant differences, though this may be 
due to the large number of parameters estimated, collinearity in the two measures, or insufficient 
independent variation. 
We follow a similar procedure to test the distinction between physical and institutional 
infrastructure.  We separate INFRA25 into a broad measure of spending on public highways 
(HIGHWAYS25), which represents a substantial share of spending on physical infrastructure, 
and a residual (INFRA25-HIGHWAYS25), representing non-physical, or institutional, 
infrastructure.14  As above, we replace INFRA25 in both the linear term and the interactive term 
in our primary specification with the two separate measures. In this case, as well, we find no 
statistically significant differences in the linear terms, the interactive terms, or the total effects of 
the separate measures.  Here, too, the lack of significance in the distinction may be due to the 
number of parameters, collinearity, or insufficient variation. 
 
                                                 
14 HIGHWAYS25 consists of average expenditures over the prior 25 years for the provision and maintenance of 
highway facilities, including toll turnpikes, bridges, tunnels, and ferries, as well as regular roads, highways, and city 
streets.   
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 Conclusion 
Evidence from a half-century panel of 49 U.S. states is consistent with significant region-
specific complementarity between tax-financed expenditures on public infrastructure and tax-
financed spending on both K-12 and higher education. The effect is identified using a recursive 
structure, very long lags with a half century of data, and extensive controls for both fixed and 
time-varying heterogeneity. Robustness is probed in several ways, including comparisons of the 
similarity of OLS and instrumental-variable estimates when the instruments are both empirically 
powerful and statistically exogenous, tests of Granger-causality, alternative lag structures for 
both the instruments and the tax expenditure variables, and inclusion of a set of variables to 
account for spatial interaction among neighboring states. The region-specific complementarity 
we find offers one plausible explanation for how regions can capture returns to public 
investments in education, even with mobile residents.  
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Table 1.  Summary Statistics, 49 U.S. States, 1962-2002 (N=441)




log change in state real personal 
income per capita (multiplied by 100) 12.10 11.39 30.14 -9.93 5.56
TAXES
ratio of state and local taxes to state 
personal income (multiplied by 100) 10.07 10.01 17.75 7.13 1.33
FEES
ratio of state and local fees to state 
personal income (multiplied by 100) 3.86 3.72 12.85 1.02 1.52
EDUC ratio of state and local expenditures on K-12 and higher education to state 
personal income (multiplied by 100) 6.43 6.38 11.58 3.70 1.19
INFRA
ratio of state and local expenditures 
on productive government services 
except education to state personal 
income (multiplied by 100) 7.43 7.17 14.81 4.70 1.51
OTHER
ratio of state and local expenditures 
on health, welfare, and other transfers 
to state personal income (multiplied 
by 100) 3.46 3.25 8.40 1.28 1.27
FED
ratio of net federal transfers to state 
and local government to state personal 
income (multiplied by 100) 3.57 3.37 7.68 0.91 1.27
SURPLUS
ratio of state and local government 
surplus to state personal income 
(multiplied by 100) 0.18 0.19 8.51 -3.09 0.99




Variable (1-OLS) (2-OLS) (3-OLS) (4-GMM)
Constant 11.776 13.369 81.713 ***
(9.697) (9.807) (21.531)
GROWTH(-1) -0.121 ** -0.121 ** -0.132 ** 0.014
(0.054) (0.054) (0.052) (0.106)
EDUC25+INFRA25 1.501 *
(0.776)
EDUC25 0.367 -9.337 *** -9.274 ***
(1.364) (3.117) (3.417)
INFRA25 2.064 ** -6.854 ** -6.272 **
(0.955) (2.671) (2.950)
EDUC25*INFRA25 1.201 *** 1.188 ***
(0.357) (0.374)
OTHER25 -1.364 -1.111 -2.743 ** -3.631 **
(1.408) (1.421) (0.137) (1.449)
FED25 -0.601 -0.388 1.872 1.638
(1.541) (1.544) (1.550) (1.711)
UR -2.344 *** -2.362 *** -2.357 *** -3.377 ***
(0.225) (0.225) (0.216) (0.399)
SURPLUS25 1.138 1.281 -0.440 -0.151
(1.065) (1.065) (1.094) (1.162)
Fixed period effects yes yes yes yes
Fixed state effects yes yes yes yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.468 0.469 0.504 0.464
J-statistic 16.388
Number of observations 294 294 294 245
* significant at the ten percent level.
** significant at the five percent level.
*** significant at the one percent level.




Variable (1) (2) (3)
Constant 75.956 *** 78.764 *** 91.379 ***
(21.442) (20.212) (23.926)
GROWTH(-1) -0.132 ** -0.150 ***
(0.052) (0.052)
EDUC25 -8.717 *** -8.909 *** -7.762 **
(3.119) (2.893) (3.120)
INFRA25 -6.286 ** -6.401 *** -5.966 **
(2.665) (2.424) (2.656)
EDUC25*INFRA25 1.155 *** 1.141 *** 1.017 ***
(0.348) (0.308) (0.347)
OTHER25 -2.646 * -2.624 ** -2.899 **
(1.346) (1.330) (1.341)
FED25 1.453 1.663 2.460  
(1.530) (1.451) (1.529)








Fixed period effects yes yes yes
Fixed state effects yes yes yes
R-squared 0.490 0.506 0.511
Number of observations 294 294 294
* significant at the ten percent level.
** significant at the five percent level.
*** significant at the one percent level.
Table 3.  OLS Regression Estimates (Sensitivity Analysis)
(robust standard errors)
 
Notes: REGION_EDUC and REGION_INFRA represent average EDUC and INFRA for other states  
in the same census region. 
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Variable (1) (2)
Constant 115.153 *** 49.059 ***
(27.995) (14.085)
GROWTH(-1) -0.204 *** -0.160 ***
(0.054) (0.046)
EDUCn -13.888 *** -4.221 **
(3.939) (2.030)
INFRAn -11.216 *** -3.156 *
(3.448) (1.732)
EDUCn*INFRAn 1.962 *** 0.554 **
(0.423) (0.226)
OTHERn -5.674 *** -1.668 *
(2.031) (0.991)
FEDn 1.921 2.041 **
(2.435) (1.007)




Lag specification (n) 30 years 20 years
Fixed period effects yes yes
Fixed state effects yes yes
R-squared 0.552 0.491
Number of observations 245 294
* significant at the ten percent level.
** significant at the five percent level.
*** significant at the one percent level.
Table 4. OLS Regression Estimates, Specifications with Alternative Lag Structures
(robust standard errors)
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